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Bearing Silent Witness: A Grandfather’s Secret Attestation to 
German War Crimes in Occupied France 
 
McKay M. Smith 
 
Over half a century after the Nazi era, the U.S. Government continues to keep secret 
much of the information it has on Nazi war criminals. It is imperative that this 
information receive full scrutiny by the public. Only through an informed understanding 
of the Nazi era and its aftermath can we guard against a repeat of one of the darkest 
moments in history.
1
  
Rep. Stephen Horn, July 1998 
 
Introduction 
The Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act of 1998 required the U.S. Government to expedite the 
release of classified intelligence information related to German war crimes committed during 
World War II.2 In an effort to fulfill this mandate, an interagency working group was called upon 
to “locate, identify, recommend for declassification, and make available to the public at the 
National Archives and Records Administration, all classified Nazi war criminal records of the 
United States.”3 This working group would ultimately release over 8.5 million pages from 
documents “scattered among the vast quantities of files stored in the national archives and 
individual federal agencies.”4 As a result, this project would come to be regarded as the “largest 
congressionally mandated declassification effort in history.”5 Although members of Congress 
were successful in initiating an unprecedented release of information,6 their efforts are notable 
for another reason as well — America’s lawmakers failed to allocate funds for the continued 
research and preservation of this material.7 Rather, they left this substantial responsibility to 
inquisitive historians and members of the general public.8  
 
Scholars have acknowledged that the study of World War II era intelligence can be an extremely 
arduous undertaking.9 Intelligence tradecraft, by its very nature, requires that certain information 
                                                             
1 Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act: Hearing on H.R. 4007 and S. 1379 Before the Subcomm. on Gov’t Mgmt., Info., 
and Tech. of the H. Comm. on Gov’t Reform and Oversight, 105th Cong. 1 (1998) [hereinafter Hearing] (Statement 
of Rep. Stephen Horn, Chairman, Subcomm. on Gov’t Mgmt., Info., and Tech.).  
2 Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act, Pub. L. No. 105-246, 112 Stat. 1859 (1998) (codified as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 
522 note).  
3 Ibid, 1(c)(1); See also Nazi War Criminal Records Interagency Working Group, Implementation of Nazi War 
Crimes Disclosure Act: An Interim Report to Congress (1999).  
4 Nazi War Crimes and Japanese Imperial Government Records Interagency Working Group, Final Report to 
Congress, at 1, 5 (2007) [hereinafter Final Report].  
5 Ibid, 1. 
6 See generally Hearing, supra note 1, at 2 (describing congressional intent behind the Nazi War Crimes Disclosure 
Act of 1998).  
7 Implementation of the Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Gov’t Mgmt., Info., 
and Tech. of the H. Comm. on Gov’t Reform and Oversight, 106th Cong. 8 (2000) (Statement of Dr. Michael Kurtz, 
Assistant Archivist of the United States, Nat’l Archives and Records Admin.).  
8 Ibid,15; see also Final Report, supra note 4, at 1, 2 (clarifying that agency participants did not receive independent 
funding for the prolonged study of these documents—rather, their mandate was to release these records to the 
general public).   
9 Richard breitman et al., u.s. intelligence and the nazis 8 (2005); richard aldrich, the hidden hand: britain, american, 
and cold war secret intelligence 16 (2001).  
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remain secret.10 It necessitates the sustained concealment of activities and events.11 Moreover, 
this government emphasis on secrecy often results in the suppression of sensitive information 
from historians and citizens alike.12 Thus, it has “become a tradition in intelligence scholarship to 
look to the declassified records of the past for enlightenment.”13 This trend has led multiple 
historians to conclude that “there are remarkable fragments of the story which have lain 
undiscovered in improbable places for more than fifty years.”14 Consequently, those choosing to 
carry out archival research “will undoubtedly find their own discoveries in these declassified 
documents and in related records of the National Archives.”15  
 
This Article should be regarded as a spirited departure from traditional legal scholarship. It 
endeavors to be a “largely empirical contribution to the start of a wider project”16 — namely, one 
that examines fragments of declassified intelligence and attempts to place this information into a 
larger mosaic of historical events.17 The following discussion utilizes the case study method to 
communicate a powerful message related to both law and history. Readers are encouraged to 
examine this narrative and related analysis in conjunction with the primary source material it 
references. More importantly, they are asked to evaluate relevant provisions of international law 
and to apply these principles to a specific declassified report. It is through a similar process that 
this Article arrives at its central conclusion.  
 
Background 
There is little doubt that memory is an essential concept for historians.18 In their search for “the 
‘truth’ of remembered account,” scholars often turn to the case study method to “record and 
value” historical events.19 In his recent work related to postwar intelligence, Michael Salter 
emphasizes the importance of the case study in placing declassified intelligence into its broader 
historical context.20 Specifically, he suggests that “detailed case studies can be as revealing of 
                                                             
10 Mark Lowenthal, intelligence: from secrets to policy 1 (2009); John Radsan, The Unresolved Equation of 
Espionage and International Law, 28 Mich. J. Int’l L. 595, 599-602 (2007).  
11 See Lowenthal, supra note 10, at 1.  
12 See id. (explaining that secrecy can be a source of consternation to private citizens, especially in a democratic 
society such as the United States).  
13 Lorie Charlesworth, 2 SAS Regiment, War Crimes Investigations, and British Intelligence: Intelligence Officials 
and the Natzweiler Trial, 6 J. Intelligence Hist. 21 (2006) [hereinafter Charlesworth, 2 SAS Regiment].  
14 Aldrich, supra note 9, at 15. See also Breitman et al., supra note 9, at 8; Michael Salter, Nazi War Crimes, U.S. 
Intelligence and Selective Prosecution at Nuremberg: Controversies Regarding the Role of the Office of Strategic 
Services 2, 3 (2007).  
15 Breitman et al., supra note 9, at 8.  
16 Salter, supra note 14, at 4.  
17 Aldrich, supra note 9, at 15, 16; Salter, supra note 14, at 5 (discussing the inherent difficulty in researching events 
that are recorded in documents scattered across various archival collections); Charlesworth, 2 SAS Regiment, supra 
note 13, at 21 (comparing the study of declassified intelligence to assembling a larger mosaic of historical 
information).  
18 Lorie Charlesworth, Forgotten Justice: Forgetting Law’s History and Victim’s Justice in British “Minor” War 
Crimes Trials 1945-48, 74 Amicus Curiae 2 (2008) [hereinafter Charlesworth, Forgotten Justice].  
19 See id. at 4.  
20 See Salter, supra note 14, at 3. See also Michael Salter, Intelligence Agencies and War Crimes Prosecution: Allen 
Dulles’s Involvement in Witness Testimony at Nuremberg, 2 J. Int’l Crim. Just. 826 (2004) (describing CIA Director 
Allen Dulles’s involvement in the Nuremberg proceedings); Michael Salter, Trial by Media: The Psychological 
Warfare Background to OSS’s Contribution to the Nuremberg War Crimes Trials, 9 J. Intelligence Hist. 15 (2010) 
(analyzing the role of the Office of Strategic Services in the Nuremberg proceedings); Ian Bryan & Michael Salter, 
War Crimes Prosecutors and Intelligence Agencies: The Case for Assessing their Collaboration, 16 Intelligence & 
Nat’l Security 93 (2001) (providing additional discussion of the involvement of intelligence agencies in monitoring 
war criminality).  
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wider historical and institutional tendencies as apparently broader sociological approaches that 
seek to capture and generalize about the entire field.”21 As Salter’s viewpoints have gained 
acceptance amongst prominent academic circles, a new legal sub-discipline has started to 
emerge. 
 
Socio-legal analysis is described as a “fluid, changing, open movement [that] defies a fixed 
descriptor.”22 At its core, however this approach focuses on the intersection of law, intelligence, 
and human rights.23 Proponents of this movement stress that it explores historical events “from 
the perspective of the various participants, emphasizing their ‘lived experience.’”24 As a result, 
some scholars have asserted that this legal sub-discipline “encourages the voice of the historian 
to be heard directly in the text,” thereby making remembered account an integral piece of the 
ensuing narrative.25 Thus, readers should be aware that throughout the remainder of this Article, 
“the authorial voice, my voice, disrupts this narrative… to allow other interpretations to emerge 
and to sabotage illusions of closure.”26 This was done deliberately and in an effort to familiarize 
the audience with the case study that follows.  
  
In the summer of 2011, through hard work and a bit of luck, my father and I were able to learn 
more about the man who made our very existence possible, Lt. Raymond Murphy. The task of 
locating my grandfather was complicated by a number of factors, not the least of which was his 
misrepresenting his age by one year to join the U.S. Army Air Corps in 1942. In addition, my 
father never met his birth father and knew few particulars of the man’s life. Although my 
grandfather passed away in 1970 at the age of forty-six, we were fortunate to discover a series of 
documents detailing his experiences during World War II.27 Moreover, our journey led us to his 
final resting place at Arlington National Cemetery.  
 
Although the details that led to this discovery are certainly noteworthy, this Article seeks to 
examine something much more significant — the story my grandfather was able to share with us 
nearly forty years after his death. On April 28, 1944, Lt. Murphy was shot down by German anti-
aircraft fire over Avord, France on his sixteenth mission as a B-17 Navigator with the 91st Bomb 
Group, 324th Squadron.28 For the next three months, he successfully evaded German patrols and 
Nazi collaborators with the help of local French Resistance fighters known as le Maquis.29  
                                                             
21 Salter, supra note 14, at 3.  
22 Charlesworth, Forgotten Justice, supra note 18, at 3.  
23 See id. (referencing socio-legal studies in the context of Salter’s emphasis on intelligence studies and 
humanitarian scholarship).  
24 Ibid.  
25 Ibid, 4. 
26 Ibid. 
27 The information in this Article is primarily drawn from Missing Air Crew Report (MACR) No. 4235 and Escape 
and Evasion Report (E&E) No. 866. During World War II, U.S. Army Air Corps Bomb Groups were required to 
submit MACRs when airmen were lost during combat operations. E&E Reports were required when personnel 
subsequently avoided capture by enemy forces. Notably, the National Archives and Records Administration recently 
made E&E reports publicly available in electronic format. Thus, the primary source material contained in MACR 
No. 4235 and E&E No. 866 should be examined in conjunction with this Article. Please see relevant citations and 
associated hyperlinks to access publicly available versions of these documents.  
28 See generally Escape and Evasion Report No. 866, Evasion in France (Aug. 15, 1944) 
[hereinafter E&E No. 866], available at http://media.nara.gov/nw/305270/EE-866.pdf?bcsi_scan 
_0F6519961A 220080=0&bcsi_scan_filename=EE-866.pdf.  
29 Ibid; See also Julian Jackson, France: The Dark Years 1940-1944 (2001); Claude Chambard, The Maquis: A 
History of the French Resistance Movement (1976) (providing a more thorough discussion of French Resistance 
efforts and the structure of le Maquis generally).  
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Following his escape in August of 1944, my grandfather was questioned by the U.S. Army 
Military Intelligence Service at Headquarters, European Theater of Operations.30 The 
information he provided during his debriefing was recorded in narrative form and analyzed for 
intelligence related to the continued presence of German forces in occupied France. At the 
conclusion of his interview, my grandfather signed a security certificate forbidding him from 
disclosing any facts related to his wartime experience.31 The resulting report was marked 
“SECRET” and titled Escape and Evasion Report No. 866, Evasion in France.32 Only recently 
has this document been made available to the public in electronic format.33  
 
Although my father and I will never be able to sit down with Lt. Murphy and discuss his story, 
his words are compelling even forty years after his death. As a scholar of intelligence law and 
history, I was struck by the significance of his experiences in the summer of 1944. When 
examined from a legal perspective, his declassified first person account is illustrative of a 
number of law of war topics, including the law related to land and aerial warfare, escape and 
evasion, and the duties owed to inhabitants during belligerent occupation. Most notably, 
however, my grandfather’s report also evidences criminal atrocities committed by German 
soldiers.  
 
The story told by Lt. Murphy is one of great valor and sacrifice. Accordingly, this Article will 
attempt to honor his memory while also providing a thorough legal analysis of the conduct that 
he witnessed. The following discussion will examine his experiences in the context of the law of 
war as it existed in 1944. It will also provide a modern perspective of how this body of law has 
evolved since World War II. In addition, this Article will examine a particularly disturbing 
recollection reported by my grandfather to military intelligence officers and attempt to answer 
one important question — could the terrible event described in Escape and Evasion Report No. 
866 constitute evidence of a long-forgotten war crime?34  
 
The Law of War in Historical Perspective 
In order to analyze Lt. Murphy’s account, it is first necessary to provide some context to the war 
as it existed in the skies over Europe during this period. The experiences of my grandfather and 
the crew of his B-17 were in no way unique or exceptional. Rather, all airmen in the U.S. Eighth 
                                                             
30 See E&E No. 866, supra note 28, at 1. See, e.g., Charlesworth, 2 SAS Regiment, supra note 13, at 13 
(demonstrating that intelligence collection played a critical role in post-War proceedings such as the Nuremberg 
Trials and other minor war crimes trials).  
31 E&E No. 866, supra note 28, at 21.  
32 Ibid; According to the National Archives, E&E Reports were developed to collect and evaluate data on escape and 
evasion activities in the European Theater of Operations. They included a brief questionnaire as well as a typed or 
handwritten narrative provided by the escapee or evader. Notably, these reports were not intended to collect 
information on war crimes or other criminal acts perpetrated by enemy forces.  
33 National Archives, NARAtions: The Blog of the United States National Archives, World War II Escape and 
Evasion Reports Are Now Available Online (Sept. 14, 2010), http://blogs.archives.gov/online-public-
access/?p=2751 (stating that digitized versions of Escape and Evasion Reports first became available on NARA’s 
website in September 2010); see also National Archives, Prologue: Pieces of History, 
http://blogs.archives.gov/prologue/?p=1798.  
34 Leslie C. Green, The Contemporary Law of Armed Conflict 50, 320 (2008); Salter, supra note 14, at 6 
(illustrating that under Article 6 of the London Charter of 1945, the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg 
was given jurisdiction over crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity — although crimes 
against peace and humanity had never been previously defined under international law, these terms were given 
broad application under these proceedings).  
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Air Force, or the Mighty Eighth as it was often referred to, took part in fierce aerial combat in 
the period leading up to the summer of 1944.35 One aircrew in particular, the crew of the 
Memphis Belle, made my grandfather’s squadron famous when they were the first to 
successfully complete twenty-five missions and return to America as celebrated heroes.36  
The air war had raged in Europe “for two years by the time elements of the Eighth Air Force 
began to arrive in late 1942 and deploy across the misty English countryside.”37 As the conflict 
wound on, the air war “kept on creating and re-creating itself in a furious upward curve, attackers 
and defenders alike improvising tactics on a round-the-clock basis, ransacking science and 
engineering for new technology, any kind of edge – new bomber specs and new fighter-plane 
wrinkles… ever-higher ranges in antiaircraft fire.”38 In addition, the Eighth Air Force’s mission 
in Europe was made all the more deadly by one major factor — daytime bombing missions.39 
The American forces had committed themselves to daylight bombing, against the advice 
of their British counterparts, who considered it suicidal and had long since switched to 
nighttime bombing. The Eighth still held to the theory that a tight formation or a combat 
box, of B-17 Flying Fortresses, each bristling with guns, was capable of defending itself 
from enemy fighter aircraft. And the Eighth was finding that this was a mistake.40  
 
The losses suffered by the Eighth Air Force were staggering. During the European Campaign, 
more than 30,000 U.S airmen were killed or missing and another 30,000 were captured as 
prisoners of war.41 Overall, the Eighth Air Force “took more casualties in World War II than the 
Marine Corps and the Navy combined.”42 Of the thirty-six bombers that had originally crossed 
the Atlantic to form the 91st Bomb Group, “twenty-nine had been shot down, a casualty rate of 
82 percent.”43 
 
As a result of the alarming rate of casualties, many survivors were troubled by the memories of 
friends and acquaintances who, just the day before, had been drinking next to them in a pub in 
England.44 Although some men chose to talk openly about their experiences, others suffered in 
silence.45 All airmen, however, speculated about what happened to those who were able to 
escape their crippled aircraft and survive their rapid descent to German occupied territory.46 
Robert Morgan, the pilot of the Memphis Belle, reflected on these men when he wrote:  
                                                             
35 Roger Freeman, The Mighty Eighth: A History of the Unites, Men and Machines of the US Eighth Air Force 
(1970); Marion Havelaar, The 91st Bombardment Group in World War II (1995). See also Rob Morris, Untold 
Valor: Forgotten Stories of American Bomber Crews in World War II (2006) (detailing personal accounts of airmen 
from the 8th Air Force during World War II).  
36 Ron Powers & Robert Morgan, The Man Who Flew the Memphis Belle: Memoir of a World War II Bomber Pilot 
(2001).  
37 Ibid, 102; See also Havelaar, supra note 35, at 9 (describing the arrival and deployment of the 8th Air Force in 
1942).  
38 Powers & Morgan, supra note 36, at 102.   
39 See John Keegan, The Second World War 425-26 (1989); see also David Metz, The Air Campaign: John Warden 
and the Classical Airpower Theorists 28 (1999) (describing daylight bombing and the theoretical underpinnings for 
this wartime practice).  
40 Morris, supra note 35, at 54.  
41 Powers & Morgan, supra note 36, at 106. See also Freeman, supra note 35; Havelaar, supra note 35 (providing 
more specific casualty reporting for the 8th Air Force and 91st Bomb Group).  
42 Powers & Morgan, supra note 36, at 106.  
43 Ibid, 132. 
44 Ibid, 132-33; see also Travis Ayres, The Bomber Boys: Heroes Who Flew the B-17s in World War II (2005); Bert 
Stiles, Serenade to the Big Bird 69 (2001) (detailing personal accounts of airmen who served in World War II).  
45 See Powers & Morgan, supra note 36, at 133. 
46 See Kay Sloan, Not Without Honor: The Nazi Journal of Steve Carano 129 (2008) (providing Bill Blackmon’s 
personal account of the events of April 28, 1944 — notably, Blackmon spent months in German captivity after his 
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[w]e knew every time we went up, that it was very possible, likely even, to get hit hard, 
maybe knocked out of the sky. We might get trapped and roasted at our stations, or 
riddled with flak or machine gun bullets, or captured and sent to prison camps if we 
bailed out, provided we survived the trip down.47 
 
From twenty-five thousand feet, the conflict below may have seemed somewhat impersonal or 
distant at times. When an airman found himself in the unfortunate situation of being shot down, 
however, the deadly reality of the situation quickly became apparent.48 Rather than returning to 
base to enjoy a hot meal and shower, men like Lt. Murphy and his crew members were forced to 
come face to face with the ground truth of land warfare.  
 
In 1944, the law of land warfare was primarily regulated by the 1907 Hague Convention IV 
Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague IV).49 The precursor to Hague IV was 
the 1899 Hague Convention II (Hague II).50 Although Hague II represented the “first successful 
effort of the international community to codify a relatively comprehensive regime governing the 
laws of land warfare,”51 the treaty provisions agreed upon by the parties to Hague IV are still in 
force today.52  
 
Parties to both Hague II and Hague IV laid the foundation for what would become known as jus 
in bello, or “the laws and customs of war.”53 Notably, the Preamble to Hague IV also gave 
expression to certain “high ideals” which formed the basis for modern humanitarian law.54 The 
Preamble reads in part: 
 
“[a]nimated by the desire to serve, even in this extreme case, the interests of 
humanity and the ever progressive needs of civilization; [t]hinking it important, 
with this object, to revise the general laws and customs of war… the high 
contracting Parties deem it expedient to declare that, in cases not included by the 
Regulations adopted by them, the inhabitants and belligerents remain under the 
protection and the rule of the principles of the law of nations, as they result from 
                                                             
B-17 was shot down during the bombing run on Avord, France); see also Stuart Hadaway, Missing Believed Killed: 
Casualty Policy and the Missing Research Service and Enquiry Service 1939-1952 (2008) (describing the search for 
missing Allied airmen in Europe).  
47 Powers & Morgan, supra note 36, at 165.  
48 Sloan, supra note 46, at 136. See also Thomas Childers, In the Shadows of War: An American Pilot’s Odyssey 
Through Occupied France and the Camps of Nazi Germany (2002).  
49 See Michael Schmitt, Military Necessity and Humanity in International Humanitarian Law: Preserving the 
Delicate Balance, 50 VA. J. INT’L. L. 795, 800, 806 (2010); Chris Jochnick & Roger Normand, The Legitimization 
of Violence: A Critical History of the Laws of War, 35 Harv. J. Int’l L. 49, 52 (1994). 
50 See Adam Roberts & Richard Guelff, Documents on the Laws of War 67, 68 (2000). See also Kevin Chamberlain, 
War and Cultural heritage 9 (2004). 
51 Green, supra note 34, at 41.  
52 Fritz Kalshoven & Liesbeth Zegveld, Constraints on the Waging of War: An Introduction to International 
Humanitarian Law 23 (3d ed. 2001).  
53 Green, supra note 34, at 22. See also Robert Sloane, The Cost of Conflation: Preserving the Dualism of Jus ad 
Bellum and Jus in Bello in the Contemporary Law of War, 34 Yale J. Int’l L. 47, 49 (2009); Carsten Stahn, ‘Jus ad 
bellum’, ‘jus in bello’ . . . ‘jus post bellum’? – Rethinking the Conception of Law of Armed Force, 17 Eur. J. Int’l L. 
921, 925 (2006).  
54 Green, supra note 34, at 22, 23. 
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the usages established among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity, and 
the dictates of the public conscience.”55 
 
This section of Hague IV, which would come to be known as the Martens Clause, makes a clear 
distinction between the “laws” versus the “customs” of war.56 Thus, while Hague IV represented 
a “relatively comprehensive agreement on the law of land warfare,”57 its provisions were not 
intended to be inclusive of all applicable law. Rather, the Martens Clause proscribes that “cases 
not included in the Regulations annexed to the Convention remain governed by customary 
international law relating to the conduct of warfare.”58 Consequently, this principle would be 
resoundingly reaffirmed in the 1949 Geneva Convention III Relative to the Treatment of 
Prisoners (GPW), the 1949 Geneva Convention IV Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons 
in Times of War (GC IV), and the 1977 Geneva Protocol I Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949 (AP I).59  
 
The “Geneva Law,” as this postwar collective is sometimes referred to, dictates that the 
principles of humanitarian law are applicable to any conflict, even if a nation has clearly 
denounced the Conventions.60 Thus, Hague IV, which regulated land warfare during World War 
II, contained many of the fundamental precepts for modern international agreements.61 In effect, 
the Geneva Law “complemented and supplemented” these already existing legal norms.62 
German officials, however, had a much different interpretation of the duties owed under Hague 
IV in the build-up to World War II.63 Although Germany signed and ratified the annexed 
Regulations, they maintained a specific reservation to Article 44.64  
 
Germany’s reservation to Hague IV should have served as a forewarning of events to come. 
Specifically, Article 44 states that a “[b]elligerent is forbidden to force the inhabitants of territory 
occupied by it to furnish information about the army of the other belligerent, or about its means 
of self-defense.”65 Thus, Germany’s reservation to Hague IV could be viewed as evidence of the 
country’s intention to not only invade neighboring territory, but also gather information on a 
                                                             
55 Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague IV), pmbl., Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 1 
Bevans 631, 632-33 (1968) [Hereinafter Hague IV].  
56 Roberts & Guelff, supra note 50, at 68. See also Thedor Meron, The Martens Clause, Principles of Humanity, and 
Dictates of Public Conscience, 94 Am. J. Int’l L. 78, 79 (2000); William Downey, The Law of War and Military 
Necessity, 47 Am. J. Int’l L. 251 (1953).  
57 Roberts & Guelff, supra note 50, at 68. See also Schmitt, supra note 49, at 797.  
58 Roberts & Guelff, supra note 50, at 68.  
59 Ibid; See also Rupert Ticehurst, The Martens Clause and the Laws of Armed Conflict, 317 Int’l Rev. Red Cross 
125-34 (1997).  
60 See Kalshoven & Zegveld, supra note 52, at 53-54; see also Green, supra note 34, at 23.  
61 Roberts & Guelff, supra note 50, at 68. See also Schmitt, supra note 49, at 807-11 (explaining the evolution of the 
law of war).  
62 Roberts & Guelff, supra note 50, at 68.  
63 See The War Book of the German General Staff (J.H. Morgan trans., McBride, Nast &  
Co. 1915) [hereinafter War Book], available at http://books.google.com/books?id=j3kDAAAA 
YAAJ&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_ge_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepag&q&f=false (provid- 
ing a pre-World War II translation of the German War Manual). See also James Garner, The Ger-man War Code, 15 
U. Ill. Bull. 1, 9-10, 20 (1918) (containing a complimentary analysis of the doctrine of Kriegsraison and its relation 
to Hague IV).  
64 See Roberts & Guelff, supra note 50, at 84. Germany signed the annexed Regulations of Hague IV on October 18, 
1907 and subsequently ratified these provisions on November 27, 1909. Id. at 83, 84. At the time of signature they 
made note of their specific reservation and maintained this reservation until ratification, as did Austria-Hungary, 
Japan, Montenegro, and Russia. Id.  
65 Hague IV, supra note 55, at 651.  
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country’s military defenses by forcing local inhabitants into collaboration.66 These facts become 
even more troubling when coupled with the doctrine of Kriegsraison geht vor Kriegsrecht, or as 
it is more commonly referred to, Kriegsraison.67 
 
Kriegsraison is a concept that first appeared in German literature in the late 18th century.68 The 
literal translation of this term is “military necessity in war overrides the law of war.”69 
Accordingly, German proponents of the doctrine believed that “military necessity… renders 
inoperative ordinary law and the customs and usages of war.”70 Interestingly, this belief starkly 
contrasts with the contemporary law of war framework which recognizes that “[n]ecessity cannot 
overrule the law of war.”71 In fact, modern U.S. Army doctrine explains that “[m]ilitary necessity 
has been generally rejected as a defense for acts forbidden by the customary and conventional 
laws of war.”72 Of particular note, relevant law and custom are binding “not only upon states… 
but also upon individuals, and in particular, the members of their armed forces.”73  
 
Although Kriegsraison was overwhelmingly repudiated by the international community in the 
years following World War II, the facts and circumstances in Escape and Evasion Report No. 
866 strongly suggest that this doctrine was thriving amongst German forces in war-torn France.74 
While Kriegsraison allows a belligerent to violate rules of international law it deems “necessary 
for the success of its military operations,”75 the underlying reasoning for this viewpoint is 
fundamentally flawed.76 As German forces in World War II were the sole judge of what 
constituted military necessity, the “doctrine [was] really that a belligerent may violate the law or 
repudiate it or ignore it whenever [it was] deemed to be for its military advantage.”77 Thus, 
Kriegsraison had no basis in fundamental principles of international law, but rather relied on a 
practitioner’s self-serving motivations and an innate “contempt” for the established law of war.78  
 
                                                             
66 See Garner, supra note 63, at 10, 20.  
67 Scott Horton, Kriegsraison or Military Necessity? The Bush Administration‟s Wilhelmine Attitude Towards the 
Conduct of War, 30 Fordham Int’l L.J. 576, 585-87. For a more detailed discussion of the doctrine, see also Gary D. 
Solis, The Law of Armed Conflict: International Humanitarian Law 266 (2010). Solis writes that “Kriegsmanier was 
the conduct of war according to the customs and laws of war; Kriegsraison, its opposite, was the non-observation of 
those customs and laws.” Id. He further asserts that while Kriegsraison was embraced by some German politicians 
and military officers, “it is probable that the resort to this doctrine was above all based on contempt for the law.” Id.  
68 Solis, supra note 67, at 266. See also Garner, supra note 63, at 11.  
69 Solis, supra note 67, at 265. See also War Book, supra note 63, at 68. Notably, this German manual on land 
warfare states that: A war conducted without energy cannot be directed merely against the combatants of the Enemy 
State and the positions they occupy, but it will and must in like manner seek to destroy the total intellectual and 
material resources of the latter. Humanitarian claims such as the protection of men and their goods can only be taken 
into consideration in so far as the nature and object of the war permit.  
70 Solis, supra note 67, at 266 (citing Louis Doswald Beck, International Humanitarian Law and the Advisory 
Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality or Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 316 Int’l Rev. 
Red Cross 33 (1997)).  
71 Ibid, 265.  
72 Department of the Army, The Law of Land Warfare, Field Manual 27-10, Appendix A-1 (July 1956) [hereinafter 
The Law of Land Warfare]. See also Judge Advocate General’s School: Law of War Handbook 164-65 (2005).  
73 The Law of Land Warfare, supra note 72.  
74 See Downey, supra note 56, at 253 (discussing the doctrine of Kriegsraison and its application in World War II); 
see also Norman Dunbar, Military Necessity in War Crimes Trials, 29 Brit. Y.B. Int’l L. 441, 446-67 (1952). 
75 Solis, supra note 67, at 267.  
76 Horton, supra note 67, at 586; see also Schmitt, supra note 49, at 797-99.  
77 Solis, supra note 67, at 267 (citing Clad Mullins, The Liepzig Trial: An Account of the War Criminals’ Trials and 
a Study of German Mentality 123 (1921)).  
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The First to Leave the Ship 
At 1154 hours on April 28, 1944, two airmen in accompanying B-17s observed my grandfather’s 
aircraft leave formation with its “No. 3 engine on fire.”79 The weather conditions for the mission 
over Avord, France were relatively clear with only “slight ground haze… [and] scattered 
clouds.”80 Although this enabled the heavy bombers a great deal of visibility over their target, it 
also allowed German forces below to more effectively direct their anti-aircraft fire during this 
dangerous daytime mission. The first witness to the incident remembered seeing nine parachutes 
before his vision was obstructed by other planes in the formation.81 The second witness saw all 
ten airmen bail out of the crippled aircraft before it exploded in midair.82  
   
My grandfather reported that his B-17 was “in pretty bad shape” after receiving a direct hit 
immediately over its target.83 He had been wounded in both hands by exploding flak and 
observed a substantial amount of “fire on [the] wing.”84 The gas tank between the No. 3 and No. 
4 engine was in flames, which left the crew with little time to escape.85 My grandfather “was the 
first to leave the ship” and jumped from an altitude of approximately 15,000 feet.86 He delayed 
opening his parachute to avoid German flak and machine gun fire.87 Unfortunately, he waited too 
long and the resulting impact knocked him unconscious and fractured his back.88 Shortly 
thereafter, local Frenchmen picked him up and carried him into the woods where they gave him 
some “wine and a woodman’s jacket” and “helped [him] the best they could.”89  
 
Although the pilot, Lt. James Cater, also escaped the crippled B-17, his exit from the nose hatch 
at 15,000 feet was less than ideal.90 He jumped with his hand on the rip cord, and accidently 
released his parachute while he was “still in the prop wash.”91 In all, Lt. Cater hung from his 
parachute harness, exposed to exploding flak, for nearly eighteen minutes.92 During the final 
stage of his descent, he observed German “machine gun fire from the ground, directed at [him] 
and the other men.”93 Although he landed unharmed, he reported that other downed airmen were 
not so lucky. Lt. Cater recounted that “[t]wo men were said to be shot by German machine gun 
fire” while trapped in their harnesses.94  
                                                             
79 See Missing Air Crew Report (MACR) No. 4235 (May 2, 1944) [hereinafter MACR No. 4235], available at 
http://heroesoffreedom.nl/42-97199.pdf; see also Havelaar, supra note 35, at 118.  
80 MACR No. 4235, supra note 79, at 2.  
81 Ibid, 3. 
82 Ibid. 
83 E&E No. 866, supra note 28, at 12. 
84 Ibid. 
85 Ibid. See also Havelaar, supra note 35, at 188. 
86 E&E No. 866, supra note 28, at 1.  
87 Ibid. 
88 Ibid. 
89 Ibid.  
90 See generally Escape and Evasion Report No. 827, Evasion in France (July 14, 1944) 
[hereinafter E&E No. 827], available at http://media.nara.gov/nw/305270/EE-827.pdf?bcsi_scan 
_0F6519961A220080=0&bcsi_scan_filename=EE-827.pdf. Lt. James Cater also survived the de- 
struction of my grandfather’s aircraft over Avord, France. Id. His personal account is recorded in E&E No. 827, 
dated July 1944. Thus, his rescue preceded that of my grandfather by approximately one month. Although these two 
men did not act in concert to escape German occupied France, they were both able to evade German forces by 
working in close coordination with le Maquis. Id.  
91 Ibid, 1. 
92 Ibid. 
93 Ibid. 
94 Ibid, 10. 
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When interviewed by military intelligence officers after his escape, my grandfather was unsure 
of the fate of his fellow crewmembers.95 He reported seeing seven parachutes open during his 
rapid descent, and remarked that the bombardier was exiting the aircraft “at the moment” the 
plane exploded.96 When asked during his debriefing, “[w]hat is [the] source’s opinion as to the 
fate of the other crew members,” my grandfather’s answer revealed the hopelessness he must 
have felt.97 Lt. Murphy responded matter-of-factly that all men were “believed to be prisoners or 
dead — no one [else] contacted the resistance.”98  
 
While my grandfather’s predicament must have seemed quite desperate, he was fortunate to have 
survived such a harrowing experience. As he rightfully noted, he had not been killed during his 
escape nor had he been captured as a prisoner of war. Most importantly, the delayed release of 
his parachute had saved him from the indiscriminate machine gun fire directed at his crew while 
they hung defenseless from their parachutes. While such conduct on the part of German forces 
certainly seems less than chivalrous, it is also notable for another reason. It evidences a clear 
disregard for the laws and customs of war.  
 
As a matter of course, “the belligerents in both World Wars accepted the 1907 [Hague] 
Conventions as governing their activities.”99 Although Hague IV provides limited guidance 
related to the targeting of defenseless airmen, it is notable that the annexed Regulations make 
reference to the use of “balloons” and “appliances in the air” during times of war.100 Thus, while 
Hague IV’s provisions were intended to apply to land warfare rather than aerial warfare, one 
could infer that it is often quite difficult to ascertain where one type of conflict ends and the other 
begins. This distinction is especially complicated when discussing the duty owed to those who 
have successfully parachuted to the earth after their aircraft has been destroyed. 
 
While Hague IV contains guidelines related to the treatment and care of prisoners of war, my 
grandfather’s situation was not directly analogous to that of a captured prisoner.101 Rather, he 
was a combatant who had successfully escaped his stricken aircraft and had not yet been given 
the opportunity to surrender. He was admittedly unarmed and was effectively incapacitated at the 
time of his landing.102 Despite the fact that Germany maintained a reservation to Article 44 of the 
annexed Regulations, they were bound by all other duties imposed by Hague IV when dealing 
with U.S. airmen.103 In particular, Article 23 imposes a specific prohibition on killing or 
wounding an enemy “who, having laid down his arms, or having no longer means of defence 
[sic], has surrendered at [his] discretion.”104  
                                                             
95 E&E No. 866, supra note 28, at 12.  
96 Ibid. 
97 Ibid. 
98 Ibid; See also Claude Grimaud, Ils Etaient Dix-Sept Mai-Juin 1944, at 56-64 (2011). Although Lt. Murphy did not 
encounter any of his crewmembers in occupied France, he was mistaken when he asserted that “no one [else] 
contacted the resistance.” E&E No. 866, supra note 28, at 12. Four other airmen found shelter with le Maquis 
including James Cater, Clement Dowler, Regis Carney, and Herbert Campbell. Grimaud, supra, at 56. Their story 
was recently recounted by French historian Claude Grimaud. Id. 
99 Green, supra note 34, at 44. See also Jochnick & Normand, supra note 49, at 52.  
100 Hague IV, supra note 55, arts. 29 & 53. 
101 Ibid; ch. II (containing provisions related to prisoners of war); see also Adam Klein & Benjamin Wittes, 
Preventive Detention in American Theory and Practice, 2 Harv. Nat. Sec. J. 85, 96 (2011); The Judge Advocate 
General’s Legal Center and School, Law of War Desktop 74 (2011).  
102 E&E No. 866, supra note 28, at 1, 10.  
103 Roberts & Guelff, supra note 50, at 84; Garner, supra note 63, at 7, 8.  
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In addition, German soldiers were constrained by the rules of customary international law 
articulated in the 1923 Hague Rules of Aerial Warfare.105 Although these draft rules were never 
adopted as legally binding, “they were regarded as an authoritative attempt to clarify and 
formulate rules of air warfare, and largely corresponded to [established] customary rules and 
general principles.”106 As evidence of their applicability during World War II, “both Axis and 
Allied powers proclaimed their adherence to the [Hague Rules of Aerial Warfare] and made 
accusations of their violation.”107 Specifically, Article 20 expressly forbids the type of 
misconduct witnessed by my grandfather and his crew.108 It states, “[w]hen an aircraft has been 
disabled, the occupants when endeavoring to escape by means of parachute must not be attacked 
in the course of their descent.”109  
 
Under the modern law of war, there is still no “formally binding agreement that exclusively 
addresses air warfare.”110 As if to emphasize the importance of the 1923 Hague Rules of Aerial 
Warfare, however, a number of its principles are reiterated in modern provisions of international 
law.111 Notably, GPW formally recognizes the concept of combatant immunity that is further 
articulated in contemporary U.S. jurisprudence.112 In recent times, combatant immunity has 
come to signify “a doctrine rooted in the customary international law of war, [which] forbids 
prosecution of soldiers for their lawful belligerent acts committed during the course of armed 
conflicts against legitimate military targets.”113  
 
Furthermore AP I, that has not been adopted by the United States but has come to represent 
persuasive customary international law that provides unambiguous protections for escaping 
parachutists.114 Specifically, AP I forbids the targeting of a “person parachuting from an aircraft 
in distress” and further requires that a downed airman “be given an opportunity to surrender 
before being made the object of attack.”115 Thus, it is “generally considered a rule of customary 
international law that an aircrew baling out [sic] of a damaged aircraft are hors de combat and 
immune from attack whether by enemy aircraft or from the ground.”116 In addition, once an 
airman reaches the ground he shall not be made the object of attack if “he has been rendered 
                                                             
105 See generally Hague Rules of Air Warfare (1923); Natalino Ronzitti & Gabriella Ventuini, The Law of Air 
Warfare: Contemporary Issues 43 (2006); Richard Wyman, The First Rules of Aerial Warfare (1984).  
106 Roberts & Guelff, supra note 50, at 139.  
107 Ibid, 140. 
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109 Ibid. 
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GPW]; United States V. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d 541, 553 (Ed. Va. 2002). See also Geoffrey Corn & Chris Jenks, 
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International Armed Conflicts, 33 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. 313, 336 (2011); Major Alex Peterson, Order Out of Chaos: 
Domestic Enforcement of the Law of Internal Armed Conflict, 171 Mil. L. Rev. 1, 19 (2002).  
113 Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 553.  
114 Green, supra note 34, at 177; Michael Matheson, Deputy Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State, Remarks at the 
Sixth Annual American Red Cross – Washington College of Law Conference on International Humanitarian Law: A 
Workshop on Customary International Law and the 1977 Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 2 
Am. U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 415, 419, 422–29 (1987). See also Michael Schmitt, Deconstructing Direct Participation in 
Hostilities: The Constitutive Elements, 42 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 697, 716-17 (2010).  
115 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of 
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unconscious or is otherwise incapacitated by wounds or sickness, and therefore is incapable of 
defending himself.”117  
 
Thus, the conduct of German forces described by both my grandfather and the pilot of his B-17 
constituted violations of the laws and customs of war. Despite the fact that Hague IV contained 
no specific prohibition on the targeting of downed airmen descending from their crippled 
aircraft, these actions were strictly forbidden by established customary international law. In 
addition, it is unclear how such behavior could be justified under the doctrines of Kriegsraison or 
military necessity. Certainly, killing unarmed and incapacitated airmen is not indispensable for 
military success. Rather, it signifies a gross repudiation of the laws of war and an overall 
contempt for the humanitarian principles embodied in Hague IV.  
 
Successful Escape and Evasion 
While Lt. Murphy was certainly fortunate to have escaped the fate of some of his fellow airmen 
at the hands of the Germans, his adventure was far from over. For the next three months he 
would be forced to evade capture by enemy soldiers and la Milice Française, local French 
militias loyal to occupying German forces.118 My grandfather had been trained in escape and 
evasion in February of 1944 by an Intelligence Officer in England and he found the lectures to be 
of significant value.119 As revealed in Escape and Evasion Report No. 866, he took his duties 
very seriously. When asked about the destruction of “secret papers and equipment,” my 
grandfather responded in partially capitalized letters, “I ATE them,” as if to emphasize his 
resolve.120  
 
In order for my grandfather to escape detection by German soldiers, it was necessary for him to 
blend in with the civilian population. He was lucky that the Frenchmen who initially found him 
saw fit to place a “woodman’s jacket” over his shoulders.121 Although my grandfather could 
barely walk because of the back injury he sustained during his landing, the jacket provided a 
much needed disguise.122 He remarked: 
 
“I started S by compass. Shortly after I started out, and while I was talking to 
some Frenchmen, three truckloads of Germans drove by, evidently searching for 
me. They paid no attention to me while the Frenchmen said “Bonjour” to them… 
[Subsequently] I kept well off the roads and stayed in the woods as much as 
possible.”123  
 
Throughout my grandfather’s escape, German soldiers were in close pursuit. He was told by 
resistance fighters that the “Germans formed a circle from Avord and followed him as far as [the 
                                                             
117 AP I, supra note 116, arts. 41(2)(c) & 42(1). 
118 See E&E No. 866, supra note 28, at 5. See also Herbert Lottman, The Purge: The purification of French 
Collaborators after World War II (1986). While le Maquis was composed of rural French Resistance fighters, la 
Milice Française was a paramilitary militia loyal to the Vichy Regime. In his narrative, Lt. Murphy described how 
he was weary of not only traditional German forces but also French collaborators. For periods up to a week in 
duration, he was forced to sleep “in the woods carefully concealed, for the Milice were raising hell in the section.” 
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town of] Blet.”124 This was a distance of nearly twenty kilometers. At one point, “they were just 
three or four kilometers behind; one town they entered about four hours after [he] had left it.”125 
My grandfather, however, had discovered a creative means of transportation in light of his 
injuries. He observed that “[b]icycling seemed to be quite safe as long as one ducked for cars.”126  
 
Following the D-Day invasion of June 6, 1944, travel became increasingly difficult.127 My 
grandfather noted that German patrols were increasing as a result of the Allied landing, and the 
“Gestapo ran patrols on the main roads, using chiefly motor cars.”128 In addition, the Germans 
did away with all “through trains in France” and transportation was limited to only those rail cars 
running east or northeast towards the German border.129 In the meantime, however, my 
grandfather had been fortunate to come across a French family that put him in direct contact with 
le Maquis.130 
 
After contacting the French Resistance, Lt. Murphy was moved to the farm of a local resistance 
leader, Monsieur Camille Gerbeau.131 At this point in his journey, my grandfather seemed less 
concerned with affecting his own escape and instead turned his attention towards assisting the 
nearly 575 men training at this “center of resistance activities.”132 He was introduced to the 
grand chef de resistance, and “participated in the parachuting [of resistance forces] and in their 
radio work, decoding messages as they instructed [him].”133 
 
As a result of his actions, my grandfather was now acting in concert with le Maquis and aiding 
their efforts as if he was a fellow resistance fighter rather than a downed U.S. airman. He writes 
that he was “sending out regular messages” to Allied forces and was also relaying information 
related to German “V-1” and “V-2” weapons.134 When he was finally rescued by the British 
Royal Air Force on August 5, 1944, he was fully immersed in the culture of the resistance 
fighter. As evidenced in Escape and Evasion Report No. 866, my grandfather often used the term 
“we” to describe the efforts of le Maquis against the occupying German forces.135 Thus, on 
August 4, 1944, he recalls that “we got our operational messages over the BBC… that night we 
went to the [meeting location], armed with MG’s [machine guns] and psitols [sic].”136  
 
Finally, more than three months after his plane was shot down over Avord, Lt. Murphy’s long 
awaited salvation arrived.137 Although my grandfather returned to England on August 6, 1944 
                                                             
124 Ibid, 4. 
125 Ibid, 1. 
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after a daring Royal Air Force rescue,138 the danger he faced in occupied France is even more 
significant when analyzed from a law of war perspective. Prior to World War II, parties to a 
conflict presupposed that treaty obligations applied only to international armed conflicts or 
conflicts between states.139 Notably, Hague IV and its annexed Regulations refer exclusively to 
“conflicts between nations.” 140  
 
As demonstrated by my grandfather’s narrative, however, the conflict in German occupied 
France was extremely complex.141 It had both the characteristics of an inter-state and intra-state 
conflict.142 While German soldiers were forced to defend against aerial bombardment from 
traditional military forces stationed outside of German occupied territory, internal resistance 
fighters such as le Maquis were actively challenging German control from within.143  
The multifaceted nature of this conflict allowed escaping combatants to more easily blend in 
with sympathetic members of the local French population in order to avoid capture.144 Although 
my grandfather deliberately disguised himself in civilian clothing to avoid detection, his 
interactions with le Maquis appear to go well beyond that of a typical downed airman. As a 
result, he could no longer be considered as merely an escaping combatant. Rather, his activities 
are more accurately described as being analogous to that of a spy or saboteur.145  
 
The term “spy,” as it is generally understood under Hague IV, refers to a person who “collects 
information clandestinely behind enemy lines while wearing civilian clothing.”146 Specifically, a 
person is considered a spy when “he obtains or endeavors to obtain information in the zone of 
operations of a belligerent, with the intention of communicating it to [a] hostile party.”147 While 
my grandfather provided valuable assistance to the French Resistance, such activities were likely 
conducted with substantial risk to his well-being.  
 
Hague IV makes a clear distinction between soldiers “carrying out their missions openly” and 
those seeking to conceal their identities by removing their uniforms.148 In addition, the 1923 
Hague Rules of Aerial Warfare requires members of the crew of a military aircraft to wear a 
“distinctive emblem… should they become separated from their aircraft.”149 Generally, “[a]ny 
person who collects information while in uniform retains his status as a combatant… and if 
captured is to be treated as a prisoner of war.”150 In contrast, spies and saboteurs do not enjoy 
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protected status when captured by enemy forces.151 Rather, they may be tried and sentenced to 
death for their actions.152  
 
In contemporary conflicts, AP I provides that, as a matter of customary international law, 
“combatants are obliged to distinguish themselves from the civilian population while they are 
engaged in an attack or in a military operation preparatory to an attack.”153 Therefore, it would 
be contrary to the modern law of war for a combatant to disguise himself as a civilian while 
openly taking part in hostilities. AP I recognizes, however, “that there are situations in armed 
conflicts where, owing to the nature of the hostilities an armed combatant cannot so distinguish 
himself.”154 All that is required in these instances is that an individual “[carry] his arms 
openly.”155 A combatant that is captured by an enemy while refusing to comply with these 
provisions effectively “forfeit[s] his right to be a prisoner of war.”156  
 
Therefore, under the law of war as it existed in 1944 and in modern treaty provisions, it is highly 
advisable that “members of the armed forces engaged in the collecting of information or 
sabotage in… enemy-occupied territory should, whenever possible, wear [a] uniform.”157 To do 
otherwise would run the risk of being treated as a spy if captured. Given the remainder of the 
discussion contained in this Article, it seems likely that my grandfather would have been put to 
death without the benefit of a trial had he been captured while assisting le Maquis. In fact, Adolf 
Hitler had issued an order in 1942 calling for the immediate execution of Allied parachutists as a 
matter of military necessity.158 Thus, like many downed airmen and French resistance fighters 
who met their fate, my grandfather’s death might have served as yet another example of 
Germany’s violent occupation.  
  
The Horrors of War and Germany’s Violent Occupation 
Lt. Murphy survived the harrowing experience of parachuting from his stricken B-17 and 
subsequently evading capture. Specific details of his declassified account, however, reveal that 
he was likely unprepared for the horrific nature of land warfare.159 As described in the remainder 
of Escape and Evasion Report No. 866, the conduct of German soldiers was not only contrary to 
the law of war as it existed in the summer of 1944, it was also morally reprehensible.160  
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Within the first two days of his attempted escape, my grandfather learned that survival was going 
to be a daily struggle. He slept in the woods at night and nearly froze to death.161 He quickly 
exhausted the meager supplies in his survival pack and had no food or water.162 As a result, he 
had to approach sympathetic civilians for assistance.163 One of the few facts my father and I 
knew about my grandfather was that the man was a devout Catholic. Thus, it must have seemed 
like divine providence when in those first few days he was directed to a Catholic Priest for 
assistance.164  
 
Although my grandfather spoke no French, local inhabitants likely realized his religious 
preference from the engravings on his dog tags.165 They gave him a letter and pointed him 
toward a nearby village.166 He circled the small town at first, looking for signs of German 
patrols, and then proceeded directly to the church as he had been instructed.167 When the Priest 
appeared at the door, my grandfather handed him the note and pleaded for assistance.168 The 
Priest responded almost immediately with one simple phrase — “Au revoir.”169 Like most of the 
civilian population, this man of faith was likely frightened by the threat of retribution.  
 
German forces had increased patrols because they knew “Americans were in the region.”170 In 
addition, la Milice Française was terrorizing the countryside at the behest of its German 
occupiers.171 With few options, my grandfather slept on the bare earth and later concealed 
himself amongst horses in local stables.172 He even hid in one family’s “WC,” or outhouse, on 
June 6, 1944, the day the Normandy landings took place.173 His daily existence was fraught with 
peril, and during this time, German soldiers monitored all radio transmissions in the region.174 As 
a result, a number of French operatives were captured after they signaled my grandfather’s 
position to Allied troops.175 One man who narrowly escaped had “literally been beaten half to 
death” during the incident.176  
 
Being taken into custody by German forces or la Milice Française meant certain death for many 
members of le Maquis.177 While staying at Monsieur Gerbeau’s farm, my grandfather met a “tall 
very good looking young captain in the French Intelligence Service, Jean, who had arrived with a 
short very heavily bearded chap… having parachuted into France.”178 These men came to meet 
with the grand chef de resistance and assist training operations at the farm.179 Unfortunately, 
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both men were captured and subsequently brutalized by German forces.180 Jean, the tall good 
looking captain, was tortured.181 His companion, the “bearded chap,” was summarily 
murdered.182 
 
Although these events are alarming, they represent only a hint of the true horror my grandfather 
witnessed. German soldiers throughout France used violence as a tool of occupation.183 
Furthermore, they were capable of far more egregious conduct than merely murdering local 
resistance fighters. While the deaths of members of le Maquis were certainly tragic, there is one 
particular recollection contained in Escape and Evasion Report No. 866 that defies all 
explanation.184 It can only be described as a grotesque and appalling perversion of war.  
In a handwritten note scrawled in the margin of the report, my grandfather attests to having 
witnessed a shameful atrocity committed against the French population.185 In his own voice, he 
painfully recalls: 
 
“About 3 weeks ago I saw a town within 4 hours bicycle ride up the Gerbeau farm 
where some 500 men, women, and children had been murdered by the Germans. I 
saw one baby who had been crucified.”186  
 
There is no question that the event described by Lt. Murphy signifies a complete abandonment of 
the laws and customs of war. Readers of his words, even sixty-nine years after they were first 
transcribed, cannot help but succumb to the powerful and deplorable imagery they invoke. Such 
conduct seemingly transcends all conscionable bounds of cruelty. Furthermore, it suggests a 
gross repudiation of every principle of human decency. While the men who committed these 
crimes likely justified their behavior under the doctrine of Kriegsraison, the genuine rationale 
behind their conduct may be far simpler to explain. German soldiers were attempting to terrorize 
French civilians into submission.187 In effect, they were acting out of desperation as the War 
slowly slipped from their grasp.188  
 
Despite the shocking content of this revelation, it is initially unclear whether the full significance 
of my grandfather’s addendum was recognized by military intelligence officers overseeing his 
debriefing. As a practical matter, this hastily transcribed addition was not included in the final, 
typed version of the report.189 The officer charged with conducting my grandfather’s interview 
also failed to record any other information related to this grisly remembrance.190 Rather, he 
seemed far more concerned with discussing German tactical movements and troop 
concentrations — the precise type of information that escape and evasion reports were intended 
to collect. Thus, it seems possible this classified postscript, which was unavailable for public 
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scrutiny, went unnoticed by the approving official and the Army chain of command due to its 
nearly indecipherable penmanship.  
 
By the time this document was first declassified in 1974, nearly thirty years had passed since the 
end of the War and four years since my grandfather’s death.191 In addition, the war crime trials at 
Nuremberg and other related war crimes proceedings had concluded over twenty-five years 
prior. During this intervening period, my grandfather was prohibited from openly discussing the 
particular facts of his wartime experience because of the security certificate he signed in 1944.192 
Moreover, it seems likely that he found it difficult to speak about such hellish recollections. In 
subsequently contacting members of the Murphy family, it was clear they had no knowledge of 
this report or the incident described therein. As a result, it has yet to be determined whether this 
long-faded and nearly forgotten attestation represents undiscovered evidence of a terrible 
criminal act perpetrated against the French population.193  
 
One can only imagine how this experience affected my grandfather, a religious man forced to 
observe this scene of extreme malice. These memories likely haunted him for the remainder of 
his life. While German soldiers had demonstrated little regard for the law of war, nothing could 
prepare an individual for the horrific image of a crucified child. In addition, there is no feasible 
justification for why these activities would have been necessary for military success. Rather, 
such misconduct suggests an innate contempt for all humanitarian duties imposed under 
international law.  
 
This event demonstrates an absolute disregard for the “high ideals” expressed in the Preamble to 
Hague IV.194 Moreover, it represents multiple violations of the Articles contained in the annexed 
Regulations.195 During World War II, there was “no special provision in the law of armed 
conflict concerning the treatment of the civilian population in territory controlled by a 
belligerent… although atrocities against the civilian population of the adverse party would 
amount to war crimes.”196 Rather, the duties inherent to belligerent occupation were expressed 
by a host of provisions in Hague IV.197  
 
Generally, Hague IV’s annexed Regulations “proscribe the rules of conduct and the limitations 
imposed upon the occupant on behalf of the inhabitants of the territory in question.”198 Article 43 
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dictates that “the authority of the legitimate power having in fact passed into the hands of the 
occupant, the latter shall take all the measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as 
possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force 
in the country.”199 Notably, the conduct described in Escape and Evasion Report No. 866 seems 
to embody the antithesis of protecting public order and safety.200 
 
The concept of distinction, which was first articulated in Article 25, requires that parties to a 
conflict distinguish at all times between combatants and peaceful civilians.201 This provision 
effectively precludes “the attack or bombardment, by whatever means, of towns, villages, 
dwellings, or buildings which are undefended.”202 Articles 22 and 23(e) of the annexed 
Regulations prohibit the infliction of “unnecessary suffering” and “superfluous injury” during 
hostilities.203 As noted, “[t]he right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not 
unlimited.”204 In addition, Article 50 declares that “[n]o general penalty, pecuniary or otherwise, 
shall be inflicted upon the population on account of the acts of individuals for which they cannot 
be regarded as jointly and severally liable.”205 Thus, collective punishment of the civilian 
population is forbidden.206  
 
World War II was “catastrophic for many civilian populations, especially those in besieged and 
bombarded cities, and in occupied territories.”207 At the end of hostilities, however, “there was 
broad international acceptance of the need to adopt an international agreement for the protection 
of civilians.”208 As a result, GC IV was the “first treaty devoted exclusively to the protection of 
civilians in time of war.”209 Article 3 of GC IV reemphasizes the humanitarian principles 
outlined in the Martens Clause when it requires that “[p]ersons taking no active part in the 
hostilities… shall in all circumstances be treated humanely.”210 Furthermore, Article 4 introduces 
the term “protected persons” which is defined as “those who, at a given moment and in any 
manner whatsoever, find themselves, in case of a conflict or occupation, in the hands of a party 
to the conflict or Occupying Power of which they are not nationals.”211  
 
In contemporary conflicts, GC IV requires that certain common protections be applied to 
protected persons, in particular women and children.212 For example, “[p]rotected persons are 
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entitled, in all circumstances, to respect for their persons, their honour, their family rights, their 
religious convictions and practices, and their manners and customs... [t]hey shall at all times be 
humanely treated, and shall be protected especially against all acts of violence.”213 Article 32 of 
GC IV also forbids “physical suffering or extermination of protected persons… [t]his prohibition 
applies not only to murder, torture, corporal punishment, mutilation… but also to any other 
measures of brutality whether applied by civilian or military agents.”214  
 
In addition, GC IV’s provisions have been heavily supplemented by AP I which deals with the 
protection of civilian persons during times of war.215 Notably, Article 35 of AP I reiterates 
Hague IV’s prohibition on superfluous injury and unnecessary suffering.216 Moreover, Article 51 
states that the “civilian population and individual civilians shall enjoy general protection against 
dangers arising from military operations… [they] shall not be the object of attack.”217 Thus, 
“[a]cts or threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian 
population” are expressly prohibited.218  
 
As such, there is little question that the event described in Escape and Evasion Report No. 866 
constitutes a gross violation of both the historical and contemporary laws of war. In addition, this 
incident signifies a repudiation of the humanitarian principles outlined in the Preamble to Hague 
IV and in relevant customary international law. Despite Germany’s reliance on the doctrine of 
Kriegsraison, there was no general exception to applicable treaty provisions which allowed for 
indiscriminate attacks and infliction of unnecessary suffering based upon military necessity.219 
Rather, the event described by my grandfather should have been characterized as an egregious 
war crime and punished accordingly.  
 
Conclusion 
The study of declassified intelligence has the potential to reshape modern conceptions of history. 
In particular, World War II era records provide valuable insight into “aspects of German 
behavior, and thus of Western European culture in the first half of the twentieth century.”220 As 
German forces swept across Europe, Nazi leaders worried “that ‘weaker’ contemporaries and 
subsequent generations might not understand the ‘necessity’ of their actions.”221 Thus, they 
attempted to conceal not only the corpses of their victims but also the homicidal policies 
underlying their wartime indiscretions.222 At the conclusion of this great conflict, thousands of 
war criminals escaped prosecution due in part to an “intelligence failure” by Allied forces.223 
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Scholars acknowledge that “this failure had less to do with collecting information than with 
recognizing its significance.”224 
 
Socio-legal methods have a tendency to reveal alternative viewpoints or reconstructions of 
historical events.225 As Salter notes, “[n]o single and supposedly self-sufficient academic 
discipline can ever be adequate to any research topic.”226 Thus, proponents of this 
interdisciplinary approach understand that “history is a work in progress.”227 They appreciate 
that by elevating the experience of the individual above the collective, researchers are able to 
challenge the assumptions of traditional historians. When ordinary soldiers “include personal 
comments in their correspondence, or write in pencil on the margins of reports… [t]hey are not 
writing diaries for posterity.”228 Rather, these historical witnesses are “writing in the moment to 
satisfy military requirements.”229 As a result, their words should be afforded additional deference 
by virtue of their having experienced these events firsthand.230 
 
Unfortunately, modern war crimes scholarship is often dominated by “pessimism, disapproval, 
and critique.”231 This environment of negativity has led some to reject the study of declassified 
intelligence, and by implication socio-legal analysis, as a “naive search for heroes.”232 Such 
academic detachment ignores “the possibility of alternative histories… [as well as] a broader 
understanding and recognition of the personal roles of individuals.”233 Moreover, it marginalizes 
the voices of victims whose stories have yet to be told.234 Most scholars fail to understand that 
only by questioning established orthodoxy can we truly “expose and destabilize claims to the 
authority of objectivity.”235 Thus, “our best hope of completing this complex mosaic… are 
aggressive and inquisitive historians who believe that there are no real secrets.”236  
 
Although critics of this Article will contend that numerous treatises have dealt with German 
atrocities committed during the War, there is one important distinction that must be made. As 
with any historical research, it is often difficult to shift from a theoretical analysis of events to a 
precise study of “temporal and geographic locations.”237 Thus, I went to great lengths to 
determine the accuracy of the information contained in my grandfather’s report. In October of 
2011, I traveled to the Cher region of France. More importantly, I was accompanied by a 
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remarkable historical witness, Tech Sergeant Clement Dowler, the eighty-seven year old ball 
turret gunner from my grandfather’s fateful flight.238  
 
Mr. Dowler and I saw many memorable things as we retraced my grandfather’s journey south 
through the French cities of Avord, Bourges, Sancoins, and Sagonne. Thanks to the generosity of 
the French Air Force, we gazed out upon the old runway of the Avord Airbase where Mr. 
Dowler fractured his leg during a rough parachute landing on the afternoon of April 28, 1944. 
We also visited with the wonderful townspeople of the region who sheltered my grandfather and 
still referred to him as the “géant américain” due to his surprising height.239 In addition, 
historians associated with le Musée de la Résistance in Bourges introduced us to extraordinary 
men who served with le Maquis during this tumultuous period in French history.240   
 
Of particular note, not one of the individuals present — scholar, resistance fighter, or Mr. 
Dowler himself — could state with certainty where the dreadful event described by my 
grandfather occurred. In subsequent correspondence, a historian in the region, Frederic Henoff, 
described the difficulties he encountered during his search for related information: 
Regarding your grandfather’s [Escape and Evasion Report], I had also read this 
handwritten note. When he was hidden at Mr. Gerbeau farm [sic], at the time of the 
Normandy landing, a city not far from there — Saint-Amand-Montrond — was for a 
short time a place of fights between the French underground and the Germans... But we 
don’t know [the whole] story, and perhaps your grandfather saw things which were 
forgotten then in the storm of the following fights, at the time of the liberation of the area. 
  
The scale of the carnage described in Escape and Evasion Report No. 866 strongly suggests that 
my grandfather bore witness to the aftermath of the massacre at Oradour-sur-Glane.241 This 
infamous mass murder represents one of the most disgraceful wartime atrocities committed by 
German forces in occupied France. Moreover, he may have been recalling the fighting that took 
place in Saint-Amand-Montrond, or events that transpired in another nearby village, as Mr. 
Henoff maintains. It is clear that Lt. Murphy traveled through this region, and he likely 
overestimated the number of victims he observed. Nonetheless, there is one other alternative that 
has significant historical and moral implications — no matter how improbable it may seem, this 
declassified intelligence report could contain evidence of an undocumented German war crime. 
 
Criminal acts were witnessed by many, including Mr. Dowler, during his five month escape from 
German occupied France. Despite this fact, the victims described in my grandfather’s report are 
no less deserving of justice than the millions of innocents who suffered during this brutal 
conflict. At the conclusion of hostilities in World War II, it was widely acknowledged that the 
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“Germans had ill-treated and in many cases executed Allied personnel belonging to both regular 
and resistance forces, as well as civilians… in occupied territories.”242 As a result of Germany’s 
disregard for the tenets of humanitarian law, the Nuremberg Tribunal was established pursuant to 
the London Charter of 1945 for the purpose of securing “just and prompt trial and punishment of 
the major war criminals of the European Axis.”243  
 
The London Charter was notable in that it first provided a clear definition of what constituted a 
war crime for the purpose of the ensuing proceedings.244 The principles established in the 
Charter and in the Nuremberg Tribunal’s resulting judgment would come to be regarded as 
declaratory of the law of war.245 The term “war crime” was given broad application in the 
proceedings and included conduct that evidenced “violations of the laws and customs of war.”246 
In addition, the Charter introduced a new subset of war crimes described as crimes against 
humanity.247 This designation included such transgressions as “murder, extermination, 
enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian 
population.”248  
 
Interestingly, the Nuremberg Tribunal gave little credence to the use of military necessity as a 
defense to German war crimes.249 Many felt that by distorting this concept, German soldiers 
reduced “the entire body of the laws of war to a code of military convenience, having no further 
sanction than the sense of honour [sic] of the individual military commander.”250 Thus, within 
the guidelines set forth by the Nuremberg Tribunal, my grandfather’s account unequivocally 
demonstrates that Kriegsraison is both morally reprehensible and criminal. In effect, this 
doctrine allows a belligerent to justify even the most abhorrent behavior under the guise of 
military necessity. Consequently, it serves as nothing more than a means of enabling wartime 
misconduct.  
 
While the Nuremberg Tribunal is now a fixture of the past, the majority of German war criminals 
were tried by national courts.251 This trend continues to the present day.252 One only has to look 
to the May 2011 conviction of a former guard at a Nazi concentration camp to see the utility of 
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this forum for prosecuting war crimes which occurred many years ago.253 Although my initial 
intent in writing this Article was to pay tribute to Lt. Murphy’s bravery and sacrifice, my 
thoughts often turned to the innocent French civilians whose lives were extinguished in the 
summer of 1944. I pondered whether the perpetrators of this vicious crime were punished and 
whether the true extent of their acts had been exposed to the world.  
 
As a result, my final conclusion related to Escape and Evasion Report No. 866 is that the facts 
outlined in this document simply demand further scrutiny. In essence, this Article is a humble 
appeal for renewed investigation of this historical evidence. National courts still provide a 
feasible venue for determining culpability should my grandfather’s report lead to evidence that is 
more substantial in nature. Furthermore, the Nuremberg Tribunal did not place a statute of 
limitations on war crimes or crimes against humanity, nor should the French government.254  
 
Thus, even though my grandfather passed away over forty years ago, his story could finally bring 
justice for the men, women, and children who suffered unlawful deaths at the hands of their 
German occupiers. Although I never had the pleasure of meeting Lt. Murphy, I strongly suspect 
that he, and the honorable men that fought alongside him, would have wanted it that way. 
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prosecutions are constrained by a statute of limitations. See Barbie Case (1985). Nonetheless, France unequivocally 
supported non-applicability during debate in front of the U.N. General Assembly. See Statement Before the U.N. 
General Assembly (1967). In addition, they signed the European Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory 
Limitations to Crimes against Humanity and War Crimes. See Signatories to the Convention (1968).  
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